and selective forwarding attacks is proposed. We show that our proposed protocol is not only secure from blackhole and selective forwarding attacks, but also does not impose undue overheads on network traffic.
Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) can be described as a trend causing a global technological disruption today as a result of a melding of advances in computing and communication enterprises (Airehrour et al., 2016) . IoT is set to transform, not only the user-to-machine interaction, but also the way machine-to-machine interacts. Already, we are witnessing the penetration of IoT devices in the market place. Various industrial sectors have begun witnessing the infiltration of IoT products into the fabric of several industries, including healthcare, energy, automotive and agriculture. Increasingly in these industries, users are witnessing the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), where devices such as sensors, exercise fit bits, robots and insulin pumps are progressively becoming more connected to one another (Chinn et al., 2014) . It is perceived that Internet of Things will not only significantly change the future of the industrial sectors of the world but also will bring a positive transformation to how we live. A culmination of the full potential of the IoT vision will improve the standards of the careers of many (Ericsson, 2011) . It is expected that the wide adoption of IoT will lead to a plethora of novel smart paradigms like smart healthcare, smart agriculture and smart power, amongst others. This could eventually evolve into new ecosystems of IoT that are propelled by self-aware, autonomous machines.
However, the fact that these devices can communicate with one another and over the web, poses a security risk to the Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) and other connected online devices, and hence requires better security mechanisms. There is no doubt that IoT is creating a new epoch of innovation that connects the digital and machine ecosystems and brings better speed and effectiveness to many sectors as recounted above. Nevertheless, with sensitive information increasingly being made available online via the deployment of IoT, and more endpoints exposed to attackers, the research community -and indeed the business worldare swiftly recognising that security in IoT networks and IoT generally cannot be an afterthought.
A study by McKinsey (Chinn et al., 2014) projects that the cost of cybersecurity will increase to $3 trillion by 2020 and of this, many of the security technology measures are futile. Further to the projection by Ericsson (Ericsson, 2011) that the number of connected devices will reach 50 billion by 2020, there is a pressing need to profoundly rethink security for the alwaysconnected, high-volume and distributed world of the Internet of Things. One typical area of exposure in IoT is the routing packets between different IoT devices. These packets move across heterogeneous networks and are thus susceptible to various security attacks common to both the digital and machine world. At this stage of the nascent development of IoT, the security challenges need to be addressed to engender confidence in the public and globally achieve success with IoT.
The objective of this research is to develop a lightweight trust-based Routing Protocol for low power and Lossy networks (RPL) that will address blackhole and selective forwarding attacks in IoT. A blackhole attack is a denial-of-service (DoS) class of attack in which a malicious node drops data packets rather than forwarding them towards the expected destination. In a selective forwarding attack, a malicious node examines the packets received and then decides on the class of packets to drop. "Class of packets" indicates either data packets or route packets but not both. The intention, in both attacks, is to destabilise the network and the flow of data in the network (DoS).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: a discussion on the IoT routing protocols and the current industry standards is presented; this is followed by an introduction of the security features available in RPL with a highlight on the challenges in its implementation. A trustbased mechanism for RPL routing protocol is further introduced as a mitigation strategy against the RPL attacks. We show that our proposed protocol is both secure from blackhole
Internet of Things: A Routing Protocol Perspective Routing Protocols in IoT
A routing protocol is a communication process tasked with the responsibility of making intelligent routing decisions during the forwarding of routing data among nodes. Routing in sensor networks could be classified into two types, namely: reactive routing system (where a sender node triggers a route discovery to transmit data packets to a destination node) and proactive routing system (where a node constantly searches for path information to a destination network, so that the path is ready before it is required). Protocols developed are based on any of these two systems (Kute et al., 2012) .
Routing Protocols for Low Power and Lossy Networks
The Routing protocol for low power and lossy networks (RPL) is an IPv6 routing protocol designed by the Routing Over Low power and Lossy networks (ROLL) of the Internet Engineering Task Group Force (IETF) (Winter et al., 2012) . RPL was designed as a standard for low power and lossy networks, which includes all IoT sensor nodes. RPL is a protocol based on proactive routing, which operates by discovering routes after the RPL protocol commences.
It forms a tree-like topology known as Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG).
Every node in the RPL network selects a preferred parent based on some metrics (hop-count, expected transmission count, link reliability and link colour object) and this preferred parent acts like a gateway for that node. If a node seeks to forward a packet for which it does not have a path in its routing table, it simply forwards it to its preferred parent, which has a path either to the destination or to its own parent for onward transmission until it gets to the final destination in the tree. Path selection is an important factor for RPL, and hence the protocol uses multiple metrics for this purpose. Every node in the DODAG computes its rank from the perspective of the position of the DODAG root node (sink) and in relation to the position of the other nodes. The rank of a node decreases in the upward direction towards the DODAG root while it increases from the DODAG root towards the leaf nodes (sender nodes). RPL operates in two modes to perform downward routing: RPL non-storing mode (source routing) and RPL storing mode (stateful in-network routing). In storing mode, each packet holds the route path to the destination. This entails the DODAG root maintaining details about each nodes for downward routing purposes. The DIS message is used by any unattached node in the network to solicit for a potential parent node. DIS is triggered by a node in a situation when it cannot obtain a DIO after a certain time interval (Winter et al., 2012) . The creation of a RPL network in a DODAG is referred to as a RPL instance. While many RPL instances can consist within a DODAG, these RPL instances can have their own unique object functions (OF) for routing purposes.
Security in RPL
Security has been identified as being critical in sensor networks that are resource constrained (Le et al., 2012) . In addition, the complexity of deployment and size is also a core concern for these resource-constrained networks, such that it may not be cost effective, if not practically unrealistic, to embed sophisticated security mechanisms in an implementation of a RPL system. Further to that, several RPL deployments can resort to link-layer security or other security systems to achieve their security goals while bypassing the security features that RPL may provide. Consequently, RPL security features could then be mere optional and nonobligatory extensions. RPL nodes can operate in three predefined security options.
The first is referred to as the "unsecured" option. In this option, the control messages in RPL are forwarded with no security primitives. The unsecured status implies that the RPL network could as well have adopted other security mechanisms (such as a link-layer security) to achieve application-specific requirements.
The second option is referred to as "pre-installed". In this option, nodes entering an RPL instance come embedded with pre-installed keys, which grants them processing and generation permission to safeguard RPL messages.
The third option is referred to as "authenticated". This option permits nodes to enter a network as leaf nodes using the embedded pre-installed keys while operating in a pre-installed mode, or nodes operate as multicasting nodes by getting a key from a central authentication authority.
In the last two options, there is a secure variant for every RPL message. The security features of 32-bit and 64-bit message authentication code (MAC) and encrypted message authentication code (ENC-MAC) options are well supported, while the algorithms (CCM and AES-128-bit encryption) have become new supported extensions in RPL as specified in the protocol messages (Winter et al., 2012) . The safe variants of the RPL messages are meant to provide confidentiality, integrity, delay protection and replay protection as an added option.
However, the bad news is they all rely on past encryption solutions that have failed -and which continue to fail (Nordrum, 2016) . Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) was developed about four decades ago to safeguard the communications between two human parties. It was at no time designed to handle the complications of managing industrial-scale networks of 50 billion devices that IoT promises to usher in. The very thought of having a central authentication authority for billions of devices makes it extremely awkward and inefficient.
Attacks in RPL
The RPL protocol, like any other wireless sensor network protocol, has been shown to be vulnerable to routing attacks. These attacks have been researched and covered in (Chugh et al., 2012; Tsao et al., 2014; Wallgren et al., 2013 ) among other papers; Table 1 shows a summary of attacks in RPL and some proposed solutions.
In (Weekly & Pister, 2012 ) the authors assume the use of cryptography and they specifically use the Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) as the hash function to protect the route messages being transmitted. The researchers also assume that the cryptographic system utilised is guaranteed hence, it will not be tampered with by any malicious nodes. As discussed under the section "Security in RPL", the use of cryptography (SHA-1) will certainly deplete the battery energy of the nodes and hence degrade network performance.
The assumption that the attacking nodes will not tamper with the cryptographic system makes the proposed solution impracticable in a real-world scenario. Of equal importance is the mobility of the nodes, when these nodes join and leave the network at will, implementing encryption becomes difficult as a specific node with certain network details required by other nodes suddenly becomes unavailable. The authors of revealed the weaknesses in the implementation of the ContikiRPL viz-a-viz malicious attacks, and thus gave helpful insight into design issues that could help in the implementation of a better , A packet traffic counter monitoring system (Chugh et al., 2012) , A parent system fail-over mechanism (Weekly & Pister, 2012) ,
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i) that every node operates in promiscuous mode hence, they can overhear neighbour packet transmissions; and ii) that every blackhole attacking node will over time begin to drop all route packets thus, the effective feedback communications between nodes (i.e. the number of packets a node could satisfactorily forward on behalf of the requesting node) will certainly reflect the blackhole nature of any node.
In our new protocol, a trust-based mechanism is embedded into RPL to enhance its capability to isolate blackhole attacks and selective forwarding. (1) 
Simulation and Results
In the simulation, we have assumed that the IoT sensors are deployed in a smart building with one level. The InstantContiki 3.0 platform (Thingsquare, 2016 ) is used to perform the simulation. The various simulation parameters are listed in Table 2 . During simulation, the system considers the interference from its surroundings, such as other devices or technologies that may be in use. We have also used the TMote Sky mote (Cooja simulator) for simulation and have defined the IEEE 802.15.4 broadcast range to be 50 metres and the interference range as 100 metres. Figure 2 shows the deployment of sensor nodes. The blackhole attacking nodes are coloured pink and were allowed to run as good behaving nodes for a while before being manually nodes 28, 29 and 30 were used for blackhole and selective forwarding attacks during RPL operations. In the simulation study, we have assumed that the attack nodes behave as good nodes from the start and commence their malicious activities over time (when activated). Figure 3 shows the activation of the blackhole attacker node (node 28) after a set threshold timer while Figure 10 shows the activation of the selective forwarding attacker node (node 30).
The set threshold timer is set to 5 seconds, by which time, the network is assumed to have converged based on the specifications of RPL routing operations.
Blackhole attacks
The section following presents the simulation results of the blackhole attacks' detection and the associated network performance measurements.
Detection and Isolation
In the simulation, sender nodes transmit packets to the sink node with the following stamp on each packet sent: time, source ID, packet type (sent or received), destination ID, sequence number and data size. This is shown in Figure 4 . Packet sequence IDs are matched to ensure that packets sent are received by the sink node. Any sent packet sequence ID that is not matched with a corresponding received sequence ID by the sink node has either been black holed by the malicious node or affected by the lossy network link. However, the simulations showed strong reachability from the sender nodes to their neighbours. Furthermore, we have examined the packets dropped by the malicious nodes and they corresponded to the packets that have failed to reach the sink node. A complete log of the sent and received packets was analysed and the results presented in Figure 6 . In Figure 5 , the trust-based RPL protocol could detect and isolate the blackhole attacks during routing operations. A highlight of the attacks detected can be seen from the encircling blue pen-mark. In addition, Figure 5 displays a graph summary of attacks detected and isolated during RPL operation using the trust-based RPL protocol over a 60-minute simulation period at an interval of 5 minutes. As many as 600 attacks were detected between the 40th and 45th minute of the RPL operation. Conversely, in MRHOF's RPL implementation these attacks could not be detected, as there was no mechanism to detect nor isolate blackhole attacks.
in rank changes reflecting its high level of susceptibility to blackhole attacks while our trustbased RPL protocol showed a very marginal level of susceptibility.
Figure 2 A network topology view of the IoT sensor nodes

Network Performance
Even though we have a protocol in place which could detect and isolate blackhole attacks during RPL operations, it becomes imperative that the new protocol should not impose undue overhead on the network performance. We present below a measurement of network throughput and packet loss rates to determine if our proposed protocol can deliver reasonable levels of network performance while isolating blackhole attacks when compared to MRHOF's RPL.
In Figure 8 , the trust-based RPL showed significant improvement in throughput over the standard RPL (MRHOF). In fact, the throughput measurement of nodes 2-9, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22 and 25 was 0 kbps under MRHOF's RPL because of the blackhole attacks on the network.
This indicates that these nodes were child-nodes to a blackhole parent-node. Meanwhile, with the trust-based RPL protocol, none of the nodes had a throughput of 0 kbps, which implies that no child node had a blackhole parent node. This indicates that these nodes were childnodes to a blackhole parent-node. Meanwhile, with the trust-based RPL protocol, none of the nodes had a throughput of 0 kbps which implies that no child node had a blackhole parent node. 
Detection and Isolation
This section discusses the results of the simulation study of MRHOF-RPL and Trust-based RPL under selective forwarding attacks. As shown in Figure 10 , node 30 was manually activated for selective forwarding attacks during RPL simulation. Similarly, other attack nodes PACKET LOSS (%) NODE ID
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Trust-Based RPL (28 and 29) were also activated. As explained in the sub-section under "Attacks in RPL", a selective forwarding attack is a subtle variation of a blackhole attack where malicious nodes selectively drop packets during routing communications. From the results shown in Figure 11 , Trust-based RPL could detect and isolate selective forwarding attacks during routing operations. In the simulation, the first 25 minutes of RPL operation witnessed a flooding of selective forwarding attacks. However, starting from the 30 th minute, the attacks were progressively and significantly reduced because Trust-Based RPL protocol could identify and isolate the malicious nodes. Hence, those malicious nodes were not subsequently considered for future routing decisions. On the other hand, MRHOF-RPL was not able to identify any of the selective forwarding attacks being perpetrated in the RPL network as evident from the high frequency of node rank changes shown in Figure 12 . MRHOF-RPL showed significantly higher frequency node rank changes over our proposed trust-based RPL. node rank changes while that frequency in most other nodes ranges from 800 to 1,100. This range clearly reflects a high destabilisation of the network topology. As mentioned earlier in the paper, the high frequency of node rank changes not only destabilises the RPL network, but also affects both the efficiency and performance of any RPL network. Except for the spike experienced on node 6 with a node rank change of about 450 (refer to Figure 12 ), the Trustbased RPL protocol maintained a fairly consistent value of less than 400 node rank changes throughout the simulation time of 60 minutes. 
Network Performance
Here we present a comparison of the MRHOF-RPL and the proposed Trust-based RPL during selective forwarding attacks based on network throughout and packet loss. As shown in Figure   13 , in MRHOF-RPL, seven nodes, namely, 6, 15, 17, 19, 20, 22, and 26 , have zero kbps throughput indicating that they are aligned to malicious parents that have selectively blackholed their packets. For example, following are the number of packets transmitted by each of these nodes that are not delivered to the sink node: Node 6 (packet sent, 52), Node 15 (packet sent, 52), Node 17 (packet sent, 52), Node 19 (packet sent, 52), Node 20 (packet sent, 52), Node 22 (packet sent, 52) and Node 26 (packet sent, 52). The remaining nodes, although they had some packets delivered to the sink node however, by observing their disproportionate packet delivery rates, we can conclude that they were affected by the activities of the malicious nodes in the network.
On the contrary, Trust-based-RPL has shown significant improvement in throughput over MRHOF-RPL and has maintained a much higher throughput range overall, except for nodes 2 and 23 that record less than 2 kbps in throughput due to malicious activities. Thus, we can conclude that, as evident from Figure 13 , our Trust-based RPL protocol provides much better network throughput than the MRHOF-RPL protocol during selective forwarding attacks. Our future work intends to incorporate energy metrics into the protocol to isolate the nodes with depleting energy levels from routing decisions, while providing them with the opportunity to recoup their battery power. 
